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### Lecture 10: Formal Verification

#### Formal Methods

#### **Basics of Logic**

first order predicate logic


#### Program proofs:

input/output assertions


intermediate assertions


proof rules

## **Practical formal methods**




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x<-6	>y ∧ y>z)) → x>z)
((****) vE) ×A	x = y = x = x
X-1	$(x \cdot y \land y \cdot z) \rightarrow x \cdot z \qquad \qquad > x + 1 < x - 1$
	expressions can be true or false
	Expressions in FOPL
	a set of deduction rules
	3 - "there exists"
	V - "for all"
	the quantifiers:
	and (^), or (V), not (¬), implies ( $\rightarrow$ ), logical equality (=)
	a set of logical <i>connectives</i> :
	variables, numeric constants, brackets
	a set of <i>primitives</i> for building expressions:
	First Order Propositional Logic provides:
Inoric on	We will need a suitable logic
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
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it doesn't require a to be a multiple of b	
this precondition is stronger	+
<pre>{ a&gt;=b } x := divide(a, b); { 3c (x*b+c=a and c&gt;=0 and c<b) pre="" }<=""></b)></pre>	<pre>{ ∃z (a=z*b and z&gt;0) } x := divide(a, b); { x*b=a }</pre>
ondition A is stronger than B if: B implies A read implies as "is not as true as" or "is true in fewer cases than"	precondition A is stronger than B if: B implies A read implies as "is not as true as" or "is true in fe
nore constraints ndition is {false} re no conditions under which the program has to work pec!!!	a <i>weak</i> precondition places more constraints the weakest possible precondition is {false} which means that there are no conditions under every program meets this spec!!!
<i>rong</i> precondition places fewer constraints the <i>strongest</i> possible precondition is {true} (same as an empty "requires" clause) it is harder for a program to meet a spec that has a stronger precondition	a <i>strong</i> precondition places fewer constraints the <i>strongest</i> possible precondition is {true} (same it is harder for a program to meet a spec that has
ong preconditions Strength of Preconditions a precondition limits the range of inputs for which the program must work	Strong preconditions a precondition limits the rang
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© 2001, Steve Easterbrook	imply it. Step 3: show t	before it	Step 1: for z>(	Ľ. 9	We need to pro (assuming th	"program corre	if we write for specification	Program correctness		University of Toronto
	imply it. Step 3: show that (x>0 and y>0) implies x*y>0 (after closure)	before it Sten 2: for x*v>0 to be true before the assignment the precondition must	Step 1: for z>O to be true after the assignment, x*y>O must have been true	{ x>0 and y>0 } z := x*y; { z>0 }	We need to prove the post-condition is true after executing the program (assuming the pre-condition was true beforehand)	"program correctness" only makes sense in relation to a specification	if we write formal specifications we can prove that a program meets its specification	rectness Proofs	Correctness	oronto Department of Computer Science



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find the weakest precondition for S <sub>1</sub> and the weakest precondition for S <sub>2</sub> . Then show ((Pre and c) implies WP S <sub>1</sub> ) and ((Pre and not(c)) implies WP S <sub>2</sub> )	E.g. for if statements: {Pre and c}S <sub>1</sub> {Post}, {Pre and not(c)}S <sub>2</sub> {Post} {Pre}if (c) then S. else S.{Post}	E.g. for sequence: {Pre}S1{Q}, {Q}S2{Post} {Pre}S1; S2{Post}	this means "if $\text{claim}_1$ and $\text{claim}_2$ have both been proved, then conclusion must be true"	claim <sub>1</sub> , claim <sub>2</sub> ,	We can express proof rules more concisely e.g. using Hoare notation: Notation	University of Toronto Department of Computer Science
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# Program proofs are not (currently) widely used:

they can be tedious to construct

they tend to be longer than the programs they refer to

they could contain mistakes too!

they require mathematical expertise

they only prove functional correctness (i.e. not termination they do not ensure against hardware errors, compiler errors, etc.

efficiency,...)

## Practical formal methods:

Practicalities

Just use for small parts of the program

e.g. isolate the safety-critical parts

Use to reason about changes to a program

e.g. prove that changing a statement preserves correctness

Automate some of the proof

use proof checkers and theorem provers

Use formal reasoning for other things

test properties of the specification to see if we got the spec right

ie. use for validation, rather than verification

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Model checking does not guarantee correctness it only tells you about the properties you ask about it may not be able to search the entire state space (too big!) but is (generally) more practical than proofs of correctness.	
Model checking works by searching all the paths through the state space with lots of techniques for reducing the size of the search	
an abstraction of the program a model of the specification a model of the domain	
The model may be: of the brogram itself (each statement is a 'state')	
A model checker takes a state-machine model and a temporal logic property and tells vou whether the property holds in the model	
Model-checking approaches	
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<ul> <li>University of Toronto</li> <li>References</li> <li>van Vliet, H. "Software Engineering: Principles and Practice (2nd Edition)" Wiley, 1999.</li> <li>Section 15.4 gives a very brief introduction to program proofs, and includes some pointers to more readings. The rest of chapter 15 covers some other uses of formal analysis for specifications. In particular, section 15.5 is a nice summary of the arguments in favour of formal methods.</li> <li>Easterbrook, S. M., Lutz, R., Covington, R., Kelly, J., Ampo, Y. &amp; Hamilton, D. "Experiences Using Lightweight Formal Methods for Requirements Modeling". IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol 24, no 1, pp1-11, 1998</li> <li>Provides an overview of experience with practical formal methods for requirements validation. Is available from my web page (http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~sme/papers/)</li> <li>F. Schneider, S. M. Easterbrook, J. R. Callahan and G. J. Holzmann, "Validating Requirements for Fault Tolerant Systems using Model Checking" Third IEEE Conference on Requirements Engineering, Colorado Springs, CO, April 6-10, 1998. Presents a case study of the use of model checking for validating requirements. Is available from my web page (http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~sme/papers/)</li> </ul>
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